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When Is Killing the Unborn 
a Homicidal Action? 
Patrick Coffey, Ph.D. 
Dr. Coffey is Assisant Profes-
sor of Philosophy at Marquette 
University in Milwaukee. 
It is well known that many 
"pro-lifers" believe any killing of 
unborn life from fertilization on-
ward to be a homicidal action. 
The strongest argument that has 
been made in support of this be-
lief is based upon a philosophical 
concept of human life which is 
rooted in a metaphysics of exist-
ence and derived from an analysis 
of undisputed instances of human 
life, adult human beings. I In this 
concept all the proper functions 
of a human adult-cognition, sen-
sation, volition, affection, and 
vegetation - exist through a uni-
fied dynamic tendential act. This 
existential act is the adult's basic 
intrinsic principle of being. He 
exists through it, rather than not 
at all , and through it he is ori-
ented to function as humans do, 
rather than as some other kind 
of thing. The human life of any 
adult began (understanding life 
in the ontological and most com-
plete sense) when his basic exis-
tential principle first came into 
being. Thus any act of killing 
which excises from the world an 
entity existing through this t ype 
of human principle, regardless of 
the fulfillment or development 
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achieved, is a homicidal action in 
the moral sense of the term, 
which gives one good reason why 
it should be considered homicidal 
in a valid legal institution. 
Many "pro-lifers" insist that 
any killing of unborn human life 
from fertilization onward is a 
homicidal action, then, because 
sufficient reasons exist for desig-
nating that process as the time 
when an adult's principle of exist-
ence first came into being. Ob-
viously, they argue, there is no 
good reason for locating the prin-
ciple's beginning in something 
prior to fertilization, since no 
adult is known to have come from 
a male sperm or female ovum 
alone. Secondly, there is no com-
pelling reason for designating the 
beginning at some point or time 
after fertilization. This is true, 
the argument continues, because 
there is at least a prima face con-
tinuity in any adult's life from 
fertilization to the present mo-
ment, and no sufficient logical or 
empirical difficulties exist which 
make it unreasonable to claim 
that the basic human life of any 
adult began at fertilization . 
This line of argument, how-
ever, has been challenged recent-
ly in a study2 by Dr. James Dia-
mond, a diplomate of the Ameri-
can Board of Surgery, and Chief 
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of head and neck Surgery at 
St. Joseph's Hospital, Reading, 
P ennsylvania. Diamond argues 
that any killing of unborn human 
life can be considered homicidal 
only if the killing took place at or 
beyond implantation. Acts which 
kill human fertilized ova prior to 
implantation may be immoral, 
Diamond allows, bu t he thinks 
that such acts should be named 
anti-conceptive rather than homi-
cidal. Diamond's argument is 
based on two claims. The first 
stipulates that biological informa-
tion alone provides t he substrate 
for all moral and legal thinking 
about when a new home t ruly 
comes into being, t hus, for all 
moral and legal thinking about 
when killing the unborn becomes 
homicidal. The second is his claim 
that the biological facts about 
early human life clearly show that 
life existing prior to implantation 
cannot reasonably be understood 
as an actual or possible subject 
of homicidal action. 
Diamond's study is especially 
significant for pro-lifers because 
his sentiments obviously are with 
the anti-abortionists, in the cur-
rent abortion controversy, and 
his argument is addressed speci-
fically to those in the pro-life 
movement who support the adop-
tion of a constitutional amend-
ment that gives equal protection 
against unjustified killing to all 
human life from fertilization on-
ward. There has been support for 
the position Diamond takes on 
the beginning of human life 
among some theological ethicists,3 
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but their opinions generally tend 
to support t he position's plausi-
bility, not its compellingness. Di-
amond, however, argues from his 
position on the beginning of hu-
man life to the definite wrong-
headedness of those who seek 
the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment that gives equal pro-
tection to all human life from 
fertilization onward. I n Dia-
mond's view the biological data 
on the vital activity and totipo-
tentiality of human zygotes along 
with facts about t he relatively 
large numbers of blighted ova 
which abort spontaneously short-
ly after fertilization clearly tips 
the scale and shows the unrea-
sonableness in the claim that the 
killing of unborn human life prior 
to implantation is homicidal. 4 
To admit that t he killing of 
early unborn human life is con-
traceptive rather than homicidal 
implies significant practical con-
sequences for amendment seeking 
pro-lifers. It would not be a triv-
ial concession. As pro-abortionists 
have maintained all along, surgi-
cal procedures, mechanical de-
vices, and chemicals currently 
used to kill fertilized ova would 
then be properly understood as 
anti-implantation agents rather 
than abortifacients. In addition 
to this, it is surely plausible to 
presume, if an amendment were 
adopted which protected the lives 
of only the unborn who had 
achieved implantation, large ef-
forts would be made to develop 
better techniques both for detect-
ing the presence of young unborn 
life and for preventing its im-
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plantation. Moreover, the admis-
sion would surely deny a basic 
moral objection to "in vitro" fer-
tilization research experiments, 
namely, that no human subject 
from fertilization onward may be 
treated as a means alone. The 
critical question for the pro-lifer 
under discussion, then, is whether 
or not Diamond's argument is 
sufficiently compelling to cause 
him to change his mind about 
when a bona fide homo begins to 
be. 
Restructuring the Argument 
Before considering the question 
directly some excising must be 
performed on Diamond's argu-
ment and some reconstruction of 
it made. First, concerning the ex-
cising, it is appropriate to delete 
from the argument inferences 
which are based upon blighted 
ova ; since this fact does not really 
challenge the basis for the pro-
life claim that the killing of hu-
man life from fertilization onward 
should be considered homicidal. 
According to Diamond the nat u-
ral deficiencies in the zygotes 
which abort spontaneously short-
ly after fertilization indicates a 
lack in them of any real capacity 
to be truly human. Diamond's in-
terpretation here may be plausi-
ble but not at all necessary since 
other plausible hypotheses are 
also available,6 but that is not to 
the present point. Even if Dia-
mond's interpretation were com-
pelling it establishes no necessary 
connection between the blighted 
ova and the pro-life concept of 
human life drawn from adult hu-
mans, because no human adult 
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comes from a blighted ova. If 
Diamond's interpretation were 
recognized by the pro-lifer the 
latter could continue supporting 
his position by simply admitting 
to at least two different kinds of 
entities among human zygotes, 
those which exist through a basic 
tendential existential principle of 
human life and those which do 
not. And this admission warrants 
no change in the judgment that 
killing fertilized ova is a homi-
cidal action. Since the truly hu-
man zygotes are indistinguishable 
from the others, a point inci-
dentally that Diamond implicitly 
accepts ,7 it is the safer and ob-
ligatory course from both the 
moral and legal points of view, at 
least in matters of life and death, 
. to t reat all zygotes as if they 
existed through the basic prin-
ciple. 
Some reconstruction of Dia-
mond's argument is required 
because whatever challenge it 
presents to an amendment-seeker 
comes from biological evidence 
about vital activity and totipo-
tentiality and not from his stip-
ulation about the primacy of bi-
ology for all moral and legal 
thinking about the homicidal 
character of the killing of unborn 
human life.8 As far as I can dis-
cern Diamond offers no good 
reason for accepting the stipula-
tion, while there does exist, I be-
lieve, much good reason for re-
jecting it. The disvalue in any 
indisputed instance of homicide 
surely does not reduce to a loss 
of biological life. That loss is part 
of the disvalue, but the total dis-
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value also includes a loss from 
this world of many other dis-
cernible perspectives of human 
life, the specifically personal as-
pects of knowing and loving for 
example. In fact many pro-abor-
tionists9 in focusing upon one or 
another of these discernible as-
pects (psychological or interper-
sonal, for example) have, in 
effect, replaced Diamond's pre-
ferred biological substrate with 
their own partial perspective and 
equally arbitrary stipulation. 
This I believe indicates the 
propriety in approaching the 
question of homicide and the kill-
ing of the unborn through a well 
developed philosophical concept 
of human life derived from adult 
human life rather than through a 
construct derived from factual in-
formation about early human 
zygotes, which is the approach 
Diamond takes. As illustrated in 
the existential concept of human 
life outlined earlier in the paper, 
a plausible philosophical concept 
is complete. It excludes nothing 
significant to the homicide ques-
tion from other legitimate partial 
perspectives, such as biology or 
psychology, but also includes bas-
ic aspects (e.g., intrinsic tenden-
tial principle of human life) 
incapable of being manifested in 
other perspectives. Nothing from 
the other perspectives is excluded 
because a philosophical concept 
is rendered implausible and in-
valid in so far as it conflicts with, 
and cannot accommodate, data 
about human life proper to any 
legitimate partial perspectiv~. 
Reinhold Niebuhr has put this 
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validating point succinctly in ex-
plaining how experience can in-
validate presuppositions held by 
faith. 
Guiding presuppositions do indeed 
color the evidence accumulated by 
experience. Presuppositions are like 
spectacles worn by a nearsighted 
or myopic man. He cannot see 
without his spectacles. But if evi· 
dence other than that gathered by 
his sight persuades him that his 
spectacles are inadequate to help 
him see what he ought to see, he 
will change his spectacles. lD 
The basic challenge Diamond 
advances really comes to this: the 
biological data about the early 
zygote's vital activity and totipo-
tentiality simply renders implaus-
ible any philosophical concept of 
human life which allows the kill-
ing of early unborn human life to 
be considered homicidal. And the 
specific challenge he raises for 
amendment-seeking pro -1 if e r s, 
whose position rests upon a phil-
osophical concept of human life 
outlined at the beginning of the 
paper, is whether or not applying 
their concept to fertilized ova 
conflicts with the nature of the 
vital activity and totipotentiality 
present in early human zygotes. I I 
If there is substantial conflict 
then the application of the con-
cept to fertilized ova, if not the 
very concept itself, is rendered 
invalid. If, however, the pro-life 
concept can adequately accom-
modate these biological facts, Di-
amond's objection will be met and 
his challenge will be null. 
The basic biological fact about 
the vital activity of the early 
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zygote is that the zygote sustains 
itself through a self-cannibaliza-
tion process, 12 similar to the nu-
trient process in sperm and fer-
tilized ova. Furthermore the in-
trinsic supply of nutrients in 
these zygotes becomes exhausted 
at about the same time their 
cardiocirculatory system becomes 
functional. The extrinsic source 
of nutritive supply, necessary for 
their continued survival, then, is 
delivered when and if the zygote 
achieves a successful implanta-
tion, 1.l and the embryo makes a 
functional entry into the mater-
nal circulatory system. Other bio-
logical changes similar to this are 
also operative in early zygotes. 
The directedness of the zygote's 
internal activity, for example, is 
a maternal donation initially, and 
it is only at some later time that 
it elaborates its own RNA.1 4 
These kinds of changes, accord-
ing to Diamond, indicates clearly 
that the early fertilizatum is not 
yet a genuine human entity that 
could be the subject of homicide 
in a moral or legal sense. Rather, 
he continues, "it is defined most 
accurately as intervital (like that 
of sperm and ovum) and either 
pre-organismal or inter-organis-
mal."l; Although Diamond's con-
struct explaining these facts also 
may be plausible it is not a com-
pelling hypothesis; for the facts, 
in themselves, do not imply any 
conflict with the amendment-
seekers' concept of human life 
rooted in a tendential principle. 
Perhaps a conflict would exist if 
something completely novel ap-
peared in the zygote when its 
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nutritive process changed or 
when it became directed through 
RNA instead of a "maternal do-
nation." If that were the case it 
might be implausible to maintain 
that the same existential entity 
was subtending the changes. But 
nothing completely novel is indi-
cated. On the contrary, the facts 
suggest that a capacity to receive 
an external nutritive supply arises 
from within the zygote, and the 
facts do not deny that both the 
"maternal donation" and the 
RNA are grounded in a tenden-
tial principle of human life which 
makes it exist, and exist with an 
orientation to further human de-
velopment and completion. 
Two Dimensions 
There are two distinct but re-
lated dimensions to the biological 
facts in Diamond's argument per-
taining to the totipotentiality of 
the early zygote or morula . First, 
each of the cells in the morula 
appears capable of differentiating 
into any type of subsequent cell 
- bone, brain, or blood. Cells do 
not become differentiated into 
different organ systems until 
what is called the primary organi-
zer or primitive streak appears on 
the posterior lip of the blasto-
pore. Moreover, if the primary 
organizer of one blastula is graft-
ed onto another, further differ-
entiation of the cells in the first 
will cease, but differentiation of 
the cells in the second will recom-
mence. This, states Diamond, 
gives the scientist "an almost in-
superable inclination to identify 
hominization as being positable 
no earlier than the blastocyst 
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stage." Ii. T he second dimension 
of the biological evidence related 
to totipotent iality is t he fact that 
the biological unity of the indi-
vidual zygote is irrevocably es-
tablished only when the primary 
organizer appears on the blasto-
cyst. From that time onward 
neither twinning nor t he recon-
junction of a twinned or split 
morula can possibly occur. " But 
since twinning and reconjunction 
may occur anytime prior to t he 
appearance of t he primary or-
ganizer l ~ Diamond contends "we 
can justifiably hold that at fer-
t ilization is laid down only the 
character of the subsequently 
hominizable entity (ies), t he hom-
inization and individuation of 
which cannot be posited until the 
late-second or early-third week 
after fertilization."19 
Contrary to Diamond's opinion 
t he facts in both of t hese dimen-
sions do not invalidate t he 
amendment-seeker's m 0 ve in 
which he applies his concept of 
human life to fertilized ova. Con-
cerning the first dimension, t he 
t ransition which takes place be-
tween the undifferentiated cells 
in the morula and the cells in the 
blastula which a re undergoing 
differentiation can be explaned in 
the following way. The basic 
t endential act making the fer-
t ilized ovum a human being re-
quires a definite amount of initial 
cell matter in order for the spe-
cific organ systems in the zygote 
to develop. Once sufficient cell 
matter becomes available, the 
basic tendency's orientation to 
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develop the vegetative structure 
of t he zygote's human life be-
comes operative. T he primary or-
ganizer is t hen formed and begins 
to function, and the vegetative 
s tructure in the unborn begins to 
develop as the process of specific 
differentiation continues. T his 
interpretation is given substan-
t ive empirical validation from the 
act tha t the primary organizer 
appears to develop and form 
within the zygote. I n like man-
ner, it is not difficult to use the 
amendment-seeker's concept for 
explaining what occurs when a 
primary organizer is taken from 
one blastula and grafted upon an-
other one. T he organizer is simply 
understood as a facto r or condi· 
tion, rooted in t he basic tendency 
yet necessary for its continued 
fulfillment, t ha t is also t rans-
plantable from one blastula to 
another. T hus the organizer is 
similar to t he cornea of the eye-
ball. It too is a necessary condi-
tion for seeing and also capable 
of being transplanted from one 
eyeball to another. 
I n moving to consider the facts 
in t he other dimension of totipo-
tentiality reconjunction offers lit-
t le difficulty, given our present 
knowledge of the human zygote, 
and may be deleted from Dia-
mond's argument for much the 
same reasons which permit delet-
ing the fact of blighted ova from 
it. So few human adults can be 
t raced back to alleged recon-
joined zygotes that virtually no 
substantial relation bet wee n 
reconjoined zygotes and adult hu-
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mans has yet been established. 
To claim that the successful ex-
periments involving reconjoined 
lower morulae e.g. mice) estab-
lishes that relation is also unwar-
ranted, since there is no guarantee 
that biological facts pertaining to 
morulae in lower animals will no t 
conflict with what does or does 
not occur in h uman zygotes. The 
same rubella virus which crosses 
the placenta and infects the fetus 
in pregnant. women, for example, 
does not cross the placenta in 
pregnan . monkeys.zn Even if the 
relation between certain huma 
adul ts and reconjoined zygotes 
had been established it would 
warrant no change in the amend-
ment-seeker's position on the re-
la tion between homicide and the 
killing of fertilized ova. For this 
fact would indica te nothing about 
the relation other human adults 
have with the fertilized ova from 
which they appear to have devel-
oped. Nor would it even den 
that the principle of life in the 
adul t and reconjoined zygote was 
also present in the original fer-
t ilized ovum prior to twinning. 
It is left to twinning, then, to 
be the cri tical evidence which 
could make Diamond's argument 
a serious chall enge to the amend-
ment-seeker's position . Certain as-
pects of twinning (and an other 
set of multiple instances of iden-
tical human life ) do give it the 
appearance of being a formidable 
fact. For it is clear that identical 
twins exist among the class of 
adul t human beings. It is equall 
clear that the fertilization process 
to which any t win is related bio-
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logically invo ves the initial con-
junction of one ovum with one 
spermatozoon. Father Donceel 
has put the challenging poin t in 
these facts succinctly, "one hu-
man being splitt ing up into two or 
more human beings is, metaphysi-
cally speaking, hard to take." 21 
Donceel's point is well taken. 
T o my knowledge there is no ar-
gument available which can show 
the plausibilit of claiming tha t 
the basic tendential principle in 
both adul members of a set of 
iden tical t.wins began in the same 
fert ilized ovum . But to allow this 
does not deny that the principle 
of one twin may have begun at 
fertilization,22 nor does it den 
that the basic existential princi-
ple of human life in the other 
twin may have begun when twin-
ning occurred, i.e. when he firs t 
began to exist as an individual 
entity. Moreover, twinning in 110 
way decreases the plausibility in 
the claim that the basic principle 
of life in any non-identical human 
adul t began in the fertilized ovum 
from which that adult developed. 
Thus, although twinning indi-
cates tha t the principle of human 
life in some adults canno t be 
t raced back to a fertilized ovum, 
twinning does not deny that the 
principle exists in each process of 
fertilization , nor does it deny that 
the principle was present when 
any human adul t began to exis t , 
even if that was at the morula 
stage of development. Conse-
quently, twinning does not make 
Diamond's argument credible, 
and th e amendment-seekers' 
91 
claim that no killing of unborn 
human life from fertilization on-
ward has not been invalidated 
by it. 
As a final point it should be 
mentioned that, although amend-
ment-seekers can ad e qua tel y 
meet Diamond's objection to 
their position, it is probably un-
realistic to deny the political 
difficulty, if not practical impos-
sibility, of having an amendment 
passed which would protect the 
life of the unborn from fertiliza-
tion onward. Perhaps in the Unit-
ed States today the best pro-lifers 
can realistically expect is the es-
tablishment of an amendment 
glvmg the unborn protection 
against unjust homicides from 
the end of the first trimester on-
ward. If this is the case, then, 
the establishment of such an 
amendment should be understood 
only as a political legislative ac-
tion, and not as a morally justi-
fied one. Moreover, pro-lifers who 
actively support the passage of 
this kind of amendment, because 
it is the least evil moral alterna-
tive really available in the politi-
cal order, should make it 
perfectly clear that the base for 
their support is political rather 
than moral. Otherwise their sup-
port for an amendment which 
may be morally excusable, since 
it is the least evil of the feasible 
political alternatives, could readi-
ly be interpreted as support for 
an amendment having moral jus-
tification. That would be false 
and, in the long run, counter-
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